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Docket No.: 02-CR-369 (NAM) Hon. Norman A. Mordue, United States District
Court Judge
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
-vs- JOHN MURTARI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York Hon. Gustave J. DiBianco, United States Magistrate Judge
______________________________________________________________________________
BRIEF ON APPEAL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, JOHN MURTARI
Copy to: Respectfully submitted, ALEXANDER BUNIN Richard R. Southwick
Assistant United States Attorney By: Lisa A. Peebles, Esq. Office of the United
States Attorney Assistant Federal Public Defender PO Box 7198 Bar Roll No.:
507041 100 South Clinton Street Melissa A. Tuohey, Esq. (as to Brief) Syracuse,
New York 13261-7198 Research and Writing Attorney Bar Roll No.: 510807 Office of
the Federal Public Defender The Clinton Exchange, 3rd Floor 4 Clinton Square
Syracuse, New York 13202 (315) 701-0080
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4
ARGUMENT 11
POINT I THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A VERDICT OF GUILT
ON COUNTS 3 AND 4 OF THE SUPERSEDING INFORMATION. 11
STANDARD OF REVIEW 11
A. Trespass 12
B. Disorderly Conduct 15
POINT II THE CHARGES SET FORTH IN THE SUPERSEDING INFORMATION SHOULD HAVE
BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE MR. MURTARI’S ACTIVITIES IN THE FEDERAL BUILDING WERE
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 18
STANDARD OF REVIEW 18
A. The prohibitions set forth in 41 CFR § 101-20.305 are not limited to
legitimate purposes set forth in the regulations and result in an unreasonable
and unconstitutional restriction on speech. 19
B. The federal permit regulations do not apply to political activities and,
even if they did, they have been arbitrarily and subjectively applied by GSA
employees in violation of the First Amendment. 21
(1) The permit regulations apply to educational, recreational, and cultural
activities and not political activities. 21
(2) Although the permit regulations comply with the First Amendment on their
face, their application violates the First Amendment because they are
arbitrarily and subjectively enforced by GSA employees. 22
POINT III THE COURT’S ORDER OF DECEMBER 13, 2002 PROHIBITING MR. MURTARI
FROM VISITING THE OFFICES OF SENATORS CLINTON AND SCHUMER AND FROM MARCHING,
PICKETING, PROTESTING, OR DEMONSTRATING IN THE INTERIOR OF THE FEDERAL BUILDING
IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINT ON SPEECH. 26
CONCLUSION 28
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Adderly v. Florida, 385 US 39 (1966) 18
Alexander v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2766 (1993) 22
Bantan Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 US 58 (1963) 22
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 US 788 (1985)
18,19,20
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US 536 (1965) 27
Forsyth v. Nationalist Movement, 505 US 123 (1992) 20
Glasser v. United States, 315 US 60 (1942) 11
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 US 104 (1972) 20
In re Winship, 397 US 358 (1970) 11
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307 (1979) 11
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 US 444 (1938) 26
Moore v. Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1989) 22,26,27
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 US 529 (1975) 22
People v. Balnis, 14 Misc.2d 928 (Otsego County Court, 1958) 16
People v. Basch, 36 NY2d 154 (1975) 12,14
People v. Chesnick, 302 NY 58 (1950) 16
People v. Hill, 60 Misc.2d 277 (Yates County Court, 1969) 15
People v. Leonard, 62 NY2d 404 (1984) 12
People v. Lo Vecchio, 185 Misc. 197 (Utica City Court, 1945) 16
People v. Monnier, 280 NY 77 (1939) 15 People v. Murphy, 177 Misc.2d 907 (Dist.Ct.,
Nassau County, 1998) 12,14
People v. Ranieri, 144 AD2d 1006 (4th Dept. 1988) 14
People v. Szepansky, 25 Misc.2d 239 (Steuben County Court, 1960) 16
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 US
37 (1983) 19
United States v. Kokinda, 110 S.Ct. 3115 (1990) 18
United States v. Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1991) 11
STATUTES
US Const. Amend. 1 passim
18 U.S.C. § 7(3) 2,12,15
18 U.S.C. § 13 2,12,15
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 58 (g)(2)(B) 3
41 CFR §101-20.304 2,19
41 CFR §101-20.305 2,13,19,20
41 CFR §101-20.315 2,19
41 CFR §101-20.400 21
41 CFR §101-20.401 23
41 CFR §101-20.402(a)-(c) 23
41 CFR §101-20.403(a)(1)-(6) 23
41 CFR §101-20.403(b) 23
NY Penal Law § 140.00(5) 12
NY Penal Law § 140.05 2,11,12
NY Penal Law § 240.20(6)
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Was the evidence at trial sufficient as a matter of law to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Mr. Murtari committed Trespass and Disorderly Conduct in
violation of New York Penal Law §§ 140.05 and 240.20(6)?
2. Should the Magistrate Judge have dismissed the Superseding Information on
the ground that Mr. Murtari’s activities inside the federal building were
protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution?
3. Is the December 13, 2002 Order of the Magistrate Judge an unconstitutional
prior restraint on speech in violation of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about October 2, 2002, a four-count Superseding Information was filed
against the
Defendant-Appellant, John Murtari. (A 7). Count 1 charged that on July 29, 2002,
John Murtari engaged in loitering and other conduct on property which
unreasonably obstructed the usual use of entrances, corridors, offices, and
elevators in violation of 41 CFR §101-20.305 and § 101-20.315. (A7). Count 2
charged that on July 29, 2002, John Murtari knowingly failed to comply with
official signs of a prohibitory, regulatory and or directory nature and with the
lawful direction of Federal Protective Officers when directed to cease and
desist said activity; that is, knowingly engaging in loitering and other conduct
which unreasonably obstructed the usual use of entrances, corridors, offices and
elevators in violation of 41 CFR §101-20.304 and §101-20.315. (A8). Count 3
charged that on July 29, 12002, John Murtari, on land acquired for the use of
the United States and under the concurrent jurisdiction thereof, did remain
unlawfully at the James M. Hanley Federal Building in Syracuse, New York after
being given a lawful order by a Federal Protective Service Officer to leave the
building in violation of New York Penal Law § 140.05 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 7(3)
and 13. (A8). Count 4 charged that on July 29, 2002, John Murtari on land
acquired for the use of the United States and under the concurrent jurisdiction
thereof, did congregate with other persons in a public place and refuse to
comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse in violation of New York
Penal Law § 240.20(6) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 7(3) and 13. (A9).
Prior to trial, John Murtari moved to dismiss the Superseding Information on
the ground that his activities in the Federal Building on July 29, 2002, were
protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. (A4). The
Government opposed the motion and it was denied by the Honorable Gustave J.
DiBianco, United States Magistrate Judge, by Memorandum Decision and Order,
dated October 28, 2002. (A10).
Mr. Murtari proceeded to trial before the United States District Court for
the Northern District of New York, Magistrate DiBianco, presiding, on October
29, 2002. (A4). At the conclusion of the non-jury trial, Magistrate DiBianco did
not make any findings about guilt on counts 1 and 2 of the superseding
information but did find Mr. Murtari guilty of violating counts 3 and 4 of the
superseding information. (A153-154). Thereafter, on November 21, 2002,
Magistrate DiBianco sentenced Mr. Murtari to 10 days incarceration. (A163).
Mr. Murtari timely filed a Notice of Appeal on November 26, 2002. (A167).
Jurisdiction is invoked in this court pursuant to Rule 58 (g)(2)(B) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The charges set forth in the Superseding Information stem from Mr. Murtari
petitioning his United States Senators and Congressman to meet with his
organization, AKidsRight.Org, to discuss family law reform on a national level.
Mr. Murtari formed the organization after a Family Court Judge in Onondaga
County granted physical custody of Mr. Murtari’s nine-year-old son to Mr.
Murtari’s former wife. After custody was granted, Mr. Murtari’s former wife
moved across the country to Colorado making it difficult for Mr. Murtari to
visit his son and participate in his son’s life. The result in Mr. Murtari’s
case may have been decided differently in a different county in this state or in
another state. As such, the group is seeking uniformity in the family court law
on a national level.
On December 14, 1999, Mr. Murtari first entered the James Hanley Federal
Building located at 100 South Clinton Street in Syracuse, New York carrying a
placard with a photograph of Mr. Murtari with his son and three photographs of 3
different families that states, "Senator Clinton Please Help Us –www.akidsright.org."
(A161). Mr. Murtari was approached by building security and told that he could
not continue walking in the building. Mr. Murtari told security he believed he
was lawfully in the building and was not going to leave. As a result, Mr.
Murtari was arrested by the Syracuse City Police.
At all times, Mr. Murtari’s activity in the federal building consisted of
quietly walking the corridors of either the 8th, 13th, or 14th floors carrying
his placard. (A114,125). Mr. Murtari did not speak to anyone, unless he was
spoken to and made sure to maintain a pleasant demeanor and appear well dressed.
(A115).
On December 16, 1999, Mr. Murtari applied for a permit for members of his
organization to demonstrate in the plaza area outside of the Federal Building
between December 20 through December 23, 1999. (A156). Although the permit
states at the top of the page, "APPLICATION/PERMIT FOR USE OF SPACE IN
PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS" (A156), David Talarico, a General Services
Administration ( "GSA") employee with the property management office,
informed Mr. Murtari that the permit application system concerns only the
outside plaza area but not the interior of the federal building. (A59-62). Mr.
Talarico informed Mr. Murtari that he was not allowed to demonstrate at all
inside the federal building. (A59-62). Prior to these events, the GSA property
management office had approved a permit that allowed a man to read poetry in the
front lobby of the federal building. (A72). After Mr. Murtari’s permit was
approved on December 16th, he proceeded to walk inside the federal building with
his placard. (A67). The permit, that applied to activity that was to take place
4 days later, was taken from him and torn up in his presence. (A67-68,72).
On December 20, 1999, Mr. Murtari was arrested in the federal building for
walking on the 13th floor of the building with his placard where Congressman
James Walsh’s office is located. Mr. Murtari testified that after March of
2000, he was able to walk inside the federal building on the 8th and 13th floor
without being arrested for approximately a month and a half. (A120-121). Mr.
Talarico testified that GSA gave Mr. Murtari blanket permission to walk the
corridors of the 13th floor. (A69,74). Mr. Talarico stated that Joan Grennan,
the GSA property manager of the James Hanley Federal Building, wanted to conduct
an experiment and allowed Mr. Murtari to proceed with his activity until the
tenants complained. (A69). Ms. Grennan confirmed this through her testimony but
stated she only allowed Mr. Murtari to proceed for one day. (A95). Ms. Grennan
and Federal Protective Services Officer Berwald obtained permission from the
tenants on the 13th floor to conduct this experiment. (A93-95). Ms. Grennan
believed that if they allowed Mr. Murtari to do this, "he would stop, stop
and go away." (A95).
On June 21, 2000, Mr. Murtari was issued six federal tickets at the Federal
Building in connection with his activities. The tickets charged Mr. Murtari with
unwanted loitering, unauthorized loitering, and prohibited protesting. The
charges were dismissed upon the motion of Assistant United States Attorney
Michael Olmsted. (A123-124).
Mr. Murtari returned to the Federal Building on October 15 and October 22,
2001 and was arrested on both occasions. When he returned to the building on
October 29, 2001, he was left alone. On November 13, 2001, he was arrested, but
when he returned again on November 19, 2001, he was left alone.
On January 7, 2002, the Syracuse City Court dismissed all pending state
charges against Mr. Murtari. The following day he was issued a Federal
Appearance Ticket charging him with disorderly conduct. He returned to the
Federal Building on January 14, 2002, without incident. On January 16, 2002,
however, he was arrested. Sometime between January 16, 2002 and January 30,
2002, he entered the Federal Building, but was barred by security from going
upstairs. On that occasion, Cathy Calhoun, Senator Clinton's staff
representative came down to the lobby and gave Mr. Murtari the name and address
of a representative in Washington for him to contact for the purpose of
initiating dialogue. (A111-112). Mr. Murtari stopped his petitioning efforts in
the federal building and attempted to pursue his efforts through the Washington
representative. (A112). His correspondence to that representative, however, went
ignored.
On March 20, 2002, federal violation notices charging Mr. Murtari with
loitering and disorderly conduct and failure to abide by the lawful directive of
a federal protective officer were dismissed upon the motion of Assistant United
States Attorney Richard Southwick. (A124,151). At trial, Richard Jackson, a
Special Agent with the United States Federal Protective Service
("FPS") testified on behalf of the Government. (A21). Special Agent
Jackson testified that the FPS is the law enforcement branch of the GSA and
their duties include controlling the facilities that house government agencies.
(A21). On July 26, 2002, Special Agent Jackson received information from the FPS
office in Syracuse that John Murtari intended to enter the federal building on
July 29, 2002, to demonstrate on the 14th floor where Senator Clinton’s office
is located. (A25-26). This information came from a letter mailed to Senator
Clinton’s office and a press release mailed to the James Hanley Federal
Building Manager by Mr. Murtari. (A25-26). Specifically, Mr. Murtari’s letter
to Senator Clinton stated in part, "A group of us will be outside your
offices in Syracuse, on Monday, July 29th, in a continuing effort to petition
you and get your support and guidance in this reform effort." (A159). The
press release stated in part, "On Monday, July 29th, a small group of
mothers and fathers will try to encourage Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton to take
a personal interest in their search for National Family Law reform...A few of
the group members plan to spend some time quietly walking in the hall outside of
her office, not making any noise, but simply carrying a picture of their
children." (A157).
On July 29, 2002, Special Agent Jackson met FPS Officers Joe Chapman and
Charles Cauley at the FPS office, located on the first floor of the federal
building and awaited Mr. Murtari’s arrival. (A127). At approximately 2:00 p.m.
they received notice that Mr. Murtari had entered the building with three people
and were on their way to the 14th floor by elevator. (A30). Special Agent
Jackson and FPS Officers Chapman and Cauley took the elevator to the 14th floor
and observed Mr. Murtari walking in the hallway area of the elevator with a
photograph of a child. (A30). Special Agent Jackson advised Mr. Murtari to stop
what he was doing, directed Officer Chapman to stay with Mr. Murtari while he
went to look for the three other individuals. (A30). Agent Jackson observed
three people standing outside Senator Clinton’s office engaged in conversation
with Cathy Calhoun, Senator Clinton’s representative. (A30-31). Agent Jackson
waited for the three people to finish their conversation with Ms. Calhoun and
stopped them as they began walking toward the hallway. (A31). Special Agent
Jackson identified himself, showed them his credentials and asked if they were
with John Murtari. (A31). They stated they were and Agent Jackson escorted them
to the hallway where Officer Chapman and Officer Cauley stood with Mr. Murtari.
(A31,55). Agent Jackson then informed the three individuals that John Murtari
had a history of being in the building and being arrested for demonstrating.
(A32). Although Special Agent Jackson only observed them in conversation with
Ms. Calhoun, he advised these three people they were violating GSA building
rules and regulations and that they would be arrested if they did not leave the
building. (A32). The three people voluntarily left the 14th floor but Mr.
Murtari refused to leave. (A32). Mr. Murtari informed Agent Jackson that he did
not believe he violated any federal or local laws because all prior charges
against him for demonstrating in the federal building had been dismissed. (A33).
Agent Jackson placed him under arrest, escorted him to the FPS Office and
provided him with a violation notice for failure to comply with a direct order
from a federal officer in that he failed to cease and desist with his activity
and to leave the building. (A38).
Mary Jo Marceau-Hawthorne, one of the three people that entered the federal
building with Mr. Murtari on July 29, 2002, testified that she entered the
building to try to obtain an appointment with Senator Hillary Clinton’s office
to meet and talk about certain issues concerning family rights and family court
reform. (A100-101). She met Mr. Murtari, Richard Ichinger, and Chris Rainey
outside the federal building and they all entered the building and took the
elevator to the 14th floor. (A101). Once they reached the 14th floor, Ms.
Marceau-Hawthorne, Mr. Ichinger and Mr. Rainey went to Senator Clinton’s
office with a packet of information and petitions to leave for the Senator.
(A102). Cathy Calhoun became agitated when she learned that they were associated
with John Murtari. (A103). Mr. Murtari was walking the corridors with his
placard and was not engaged in this conversation. (A104). Ms. Marceau-Hawthorne
and the other two men did not plan to walk the corridors with Mr. Murtari but
only intended to visit the offices of Senators Clinton and Schumer. (A104). When
these three people were ordered to leave the building, they gained permission
from the officers to visit Senator Schumer’s office and they left the building
after doing so. (A108-109).
Special Agent Jackson testified that on July 29th Mr. Murtari was not loud,
(A46), there was no unusual noise, (49), people were able to use all six
elevators located on the 14th floor (A47), Mr. Murtari was not standing in front
of any of the elevators or blocking the entranceway to any of the elevators
(A47), Mr. Murtari was not blocking the stairways, parking lot, corridors, or
offices (A47-48), Mr. Murtari was not interfering with anybody who was in
performance of their official duties and he was not interfering with anyone from
the public in connection with any business that they had in the building. (A48).
This appeal ensued as a result of Mr. Murtari’s convictions on counts 3 and
4 of the superseding information; the court’s denial of Mr. Murtari’s motion
to dismiss the superseding information on the ground that Mr. Murtari’s
activities in the federal building were protected by the First Amendment; and
from the court’s Order of December 13, 2002 that has resulted in an
unconstitutional prior restraint on speech in violation of the First Amendment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A VERDICT OF GUILT ON COUNTS 3
AND 4 OF THE SUPERSEDING INFORMATION.
At the conclusion of Mr. Murtari’s non-jury trial, Magistrate DiBianco did
not make any findings regarding Mr. Murtari’s guilt on counts 1 and 2 of the
Superseding Information but did find Mr. Murtari guilty on counts 3 and 4 of the
Superseding Information. (A152-154). The evidence at trial failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Murtari committed trespass in violation of
New York Penal Law § 140.05 and that Mr. Murtari engaged in disorderly conduct
in violation of New York Penal Law § 240.20(6).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A defendant may not constitutionally be convicted of a criminal offense
except by proof that establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship,
397 US 358, 368 (1970). A conviction challenged on sufficiency grounds will be
affirmed if, viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government, a reviewing court finds that "any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307, 319 (1979). A "mere modicum" of
evidence is not sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jackson 443 US at 320. Instead, there must be "substantial evidence,
taking the view most favorable to the Government," to support the verdict.
Glasser v. United States, 315 US 60,80 (1942); see also United States v.
Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1991).
A. Trespass
Count 3 charged that John Murtari, on July 29, 2002, did remain unlawfully at
the James M. Hanley Federal Building located at 100 South Clinton Street,
Syracuse, New York after being given a lawful order personally communicated to
him by an authorized Federal Protective Officer to leave the building in
violation of New York Penal Law § 140.05 and 18 U.S.C. § § 7(3) and 13. (A8).
The New York offense of Trespass is violated when a person "knowingly
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or upon real property." NY PL §
140.05. To "enter or remain unlawfully" is defined in pertinent part
as follows:
A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when he is
not licensed or privileged to do so. A person who, regardless of his intent,
enters or remains in or upon premises which are at the time open to the public
does so with license and privilege unless he defies a lawful order not to enter
or remain, personally communicated to him by the owner of such premises or other
authorized person. NY PL § 140.00(5).
"[A] person who enters upon premises accidentally, or who honestly
believes that he is licensed or privileged to enter is not guilty of any degree
of criminal trespass." People v. Basch, 36 NY2d 154, 159 (1975). Mr.
Murtari entered the federal building, premises open to the public, during normal
business hours. When the property is open to the public at the time of the
alleged trespass, the accused is presumed to have a license and privilege to be
present. People v. Leonard, 62 NY2d 404, 408 (1984). Therefore, in order for Mr.
Murtari to be found guilty of trespass, the Government was required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Murtari remained unlawfully in the federal
building by defying a lawful order to leave.
A person remains lawfully on public property as long as the person does not
interfere with the particular purpose of the property. People v. Murphy, 177
Misc.2d 907, 911 (Dist. Ct., Nassau County1998). Special Agent Jackson testified
that Mr. Murtari was required to cease and desist his activities on the 14th
floor on July 29, 2002, because he was in violation of federal building
regulation 41 CFR § 101-20.305, entitled "Disturbances." This
regulation states:
"Any loitering, disorderly conduct, or other conduct on property which
creates loud or unusual noise or a nuisance; which unreasonably obstructs the
usual use of entrances, foyers, lobbies, corridors, offices, elevators,
stairways, or parking lots; which otherwise impedes or disrupts the performance
of official duties by Government employees; or which prevents the general public
from obtaining the administrative services provided on the property in a timely
manner, is prohibited." 41 CFR § 101-20.305.
Special Agent Jackson testified that when he stopped Mr. Murtari at
approximately 2:00 p.m. on July 29, 2002 on the 14th floor of the Federal
Building, Mr. Murtari was not loud (A46), there was no unusual noise (A47),
people were able to use all six elevators located on the 14th floor (A47), Mr.
Murtari was not standing in front of any of the elevators or blocking the
entranceway to any of the elevators (A47), Mr. Murtari was not blocking the
stairways, parking lot, corridors, or offices (A47-48), Mr. Murtari was not
interfering with anybody who was in performance of their official duties and he
was not interfering with anyone from the public in connection with any business
that they had in the building (A48).
Based upon Special Agent Jackson’s own testimony, Mr. Murtari’s conduct
did not amount to a violation of any of the provisions of the building
regulation that Special Agent Jackson arrested him for violating. Therefore,
Special Agent Jackson’s order for Mr. Murtari to leave the building was
arbitrary and capricious and was designed to interfere with Mr. Murtari’s
exercise of his First Amendment Rights.
Although the Government relied heavily upon the permit process to support a
finding of guilt on all counts of the superseding information, Mr. Murtari was
never charged with violating the permit regulations. In addition, Joan Grennan
and David Talarico, GSA employees, told Mr. Murtari that he could not obtain a
permit to conduct his activity inside the federal building. Since Mr. Murtari
was told the permit system was inapplicable to his activities inside the
building, he certainly could not be held accountable for failing to apply for a
permit.
Mr. Murtari testified that when he was arrested for trespass and issued
federal tickets the charges were dismissed. Mr. Murtari further testified that
he read the building regulations and did not believe he was in violation of them
because he would walk quietly through the corridors with his placard and not
speak to anyone or disturb anyone and he did not create any disturbances.
Finally, on certain occasions Mr. Murtari was allowed to proceed without
being arrested. In fact, Joan Grennan testified that she allowed Mr. Murtari to
proceed in the hope that he would stop and go away. Mr. Murtari was entitled to
assume that he had the right to continue his activity. See People v. Murphy 177
Misc.2d at 911 (holding Government failed to prove defendant knowingly remained
unlawfully on the premises because defendant had not been arrested on many prior
occasions that he carried out the same conduct at the same site involved in the
instant charges). As such, it was reasonable for Mr. Murtari to believe that he
had a license or privilege to be on the premises and walk the corridors carrying
his placard. Id. (citing People v. Ranieri, 144 AD2d 1006, 1008 (4th Dept.
1988); People v. Basch, 36 NY2d 154).
The trial testimony clearly reveals that Mr. Murtari was not given a lawful
order to leave the federal building because the order was premised upon a
violation of a building regulation that Special Agent Jackson could not cite any
provision that was violated by Mr. Murtari’s activity. It can be said that Mr.
Murtari honestly believed that he was licensed or privileged to enter the
building and walk the corridors when he was randomly allowed to proceed,
randomly arrested and any arrests resulted in the dismissal of charges.
B. Disorderly Conduct
Count 4 charged that John Murtari, on July 29, 2002, did congregate with
other persons in a public place and refuse to comply with a lawful order of the
police to disperse in violation of New York Penal Law § 240.20(6) and 18 U.S.C.
§§ 7(3) and 13. (A9). New York Penal Law § 240.20(6) provides:
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof:
(6) He congregate with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply
with a lawful order of the police to disperse. NY PL 240.20(6).
Magistrate DiBianco found Mr. Murtari guilty of disorderly conduct simply
because other people entered the federal building with Mr. Murtari. (A154).
"[T]he gravaman of the offense and the conduct which the statute proscribes
must ‘at least be such that a breach of the peace has become imminent or might
reasonably be expected or intended to flow from such conduct.’" People v.
Hill, 60 Misc. 2d 277 (County Court, Yates County 1969)(citing People v. Monnier,
280 NY 77, 79 (1939)). There was no proof that Mr. Murtari or the three other
individuals intended to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm or that
they recklessly created a risk thereof. "To sustain a conviction the
offensive conduct must be public in nature and must cause inconvenience,
annoyance or alarm to a substantial segment of the public, or be of such nature
and character that it would appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct
created a risk that a breach of the peace was imminent." People v. Hill 60
Misc.2d at 280 (citing People v. Chesnick, 302 NY 58 (1950); People v. Szepansky,
25 Misc. 2d 239 (Steuben County Court, 1960); People v. Balnis, 14 Misc. 2d 928
(Otsego County Court, 1958)).
The trial testimony of Mr. Murtari, Special Agent Jackson and Mary Jo Marceau-Hawthorne
illustrate that all these four people did together was enter the building and
proceed to the 14th floor. Mr. Murtari and Ms. Marceau-Hawthorne both testified
that the three other individuals intended to visit the offices of Senator
Clinton and Senator Schumer, drop off petitions and try to secure an appointment
with the Senators regarding their family law issues. (A100-104, 112-113). Mr.
Murtari’s intention was to walk the corridors of the 14th floor with his
placard. (A113).
Special Agent Jackson observed that although they were on the same floor, Mr.
Murtari was walking the corridors with his placard and the three other
individuals were speaking with Senator Clinton’s representative. (A30-31).
After Special Agent Jackson asked the three individuals to leave the building,
they were allowed to proceed to Senator Schumer’s office and then leave the
building. There was no testimony at trial that they caused public inconvenience,
annoyance or alarm.
To be found guilty of New York Penal Law § 240.20(6), Mr. Murtari’s
refusal to leave the building had to be coupled with congregating with others.
People v. Lo Vecchio, 185 Misc. 197, 201 (City Court of Utica 1945). The word
"congregate" implies the joint action of two or more persons. Id. A
person cannot congregate at any given time or place without the co-operation of
someone else. Id. There was no joint action between Mr. Murtari and the three
other individuals. The three individuals cooperated with Special Agent Jackson,
gained permission to visit Senator Schumer’s office, and then left the
building.
In order to be found guilty of counts 3 and 4 of the Superseding Information,
the court had to find Mr. Murtari guilty of violating counts 1 and 2 of the
Superseding Information. Although the court made no finding as to Mr. Murtari’s
guilt on the first two counts, the court did state that it did not hear any
testimony regarding obstruction and that the wording of the building regulation
requires the loitering to cause an obstruction in the corridors. (A146-148).
Special Agent Jackson’s order to Mr. Murtari to leave the building was based
upon this regulation. Since the regulation was not violated, the order to leave
in reliance upon it was not lawful.
POINT II
THE CHARGES SET FORTH IN THE SUPERSEDING INFORMATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED
BECAUSE MR. MURTARI’S ACTIVITIES IN THE FEDERAL BUILDING WERE PROTECTED BY THE
FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Mr. Murtari argued before Magistrate DiBianco and now on appeal, that the
building regulations are an impermissible restriction on speech in a public
place. Mr. Murtari’s activity in the federal building involved petitioning his
United States Senators and Congressman for redress of his grievances. Mr.
Murtari sought to deliver his message by quietly walking the corridors of the
8th, 13th, and 14th floors of the James Hanley Federal Building with a placard
where the offices of his duly elected United States Senators’ and Congressman
are located. This activity is protected by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. US Const. Amend. 1.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Government has the power to preserve the property under its control for use
to which it is lawfully dedicated. Adderley v. Florida, 385 US 39, 47 (1966).
"Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access
to all who wish to exercise their right of free speech on every type of
Government property without regard to the nature of the property or to the
disruption that might be caused by the speaker’s activities." Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 US 788, 799-800 (1985).
However, the Government does not enjoy absolute freedom from First Amendment
constraints while acting in its proprietary capacity. United States v. Kokinda,
110 S.Ct. 3115, 3119 (1990).
The extent to which the Government may limit access depends on whether the
forum is public or nonpublic. Cornelius 473 US at 797. The Supreme Court has
identified three different types of public property for free speech purposes:
(1) the traditional public forum, (2) the designated public forum, and (3) the
nonpublic forum. Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’
Association, 460 US 37, 45-46 (1983). Magistrate DiBianco found, and Mr. Murtari
concedes, that the corridors located in the interior of the federal building are
a nonpublic forum.
"In addition to time, place, or manner regulations, the state may
reserve [a nonpublic forum] for its intended purposes, communicative or
otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort
to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s
view." Perry 460 US at 47. As a nonpublic forum, the Government may
restrict First Amendment activity in the Federal Building so long as the
restrictions are "viewpoint neutral" and "reasonable in light of
the purpose served by the forum." Cornelius 473 US at 806.
The Government argued, and the court agreed, that Mr. Murtari’s First
Amendment rights are limited by the federal building regulations, codified at 41
CFR §§101-20.304, 101-20.305 and 101-20.315 and the federal permit
regulations, codified at 41 CFR §§ 101-20.400 through 101-20.409.
A. The prohibitions set forth in 41 CFR § 101-20.305 are not limited to
legitimate purposes set forth in the regulations and result in an unreasonable
and unconstitutional restriction on speech.
Special Agent Jackson testified that Mr. Murtari’s activity violated the
federal building regulation entitled "Disturbances". The regulation
states:
"Any loitering, disorderly conduct, or other conduct on property which
creates loud or unusual noise or a nuisance; which unreasonably obstructs the
usual use of entrances, foyers, lobbies, corridors, offices, elevators,
stairways, or parking lots; which otherwise impedes or disrupts the performance
of official duties by Government employees; or which prevents the general public
from obtaining the administrative services provided on the property in a timely
manner, is prohibited." 41 CFR §101-20.305.
This regulation is viewpoint neutral as written and is justified by the need
to prevent disturbances inside the federal building. However, it sweeps too
broadly by inviting federal protective officers to restrict behavior that in no
way creates a disturbance, such as quietly walking the corridors carrying a
placard. "A Government regulation that allows arbitrary application, and is
thus unconstitutionally overbroad, is ‘inherently inconsistent with a valid
time, place, and manner regulation because such discretion has the potential for
becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view." Forsyth v.
Nationalist Movement, 505 US 123, 130 (1992). For example, a person working in
the federal building who wears an anti-abortion button could be subject to
arrest if they enter the building, take the elevator to their respective floor,
exit the elevator and walk the corridor to their office.
A crucial inquiry is whether the manner of expression is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular
time. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 116 (1972). For example, a silent
vigil would not interfere with a public library whereas making a speech in the
reading room of the library would. Id. Peaceful walking in the corridors of the
federal building, as Special Agent Jackson testified, does not interfere with
the normal activity of the federal building. (A46-48).
One factor bearing upon reasonableness is the availability of alternative
channels of communication. Cornelius 473 US at 807. Mr. Murtari was informed by
GSA employee David Talarico that he was only allowed to demonstrate in the plaza
area outside of the federal building. The impact of Mr. Murtari’s message will
suffer if it must be conveyed only outside the building. The James Hanley
Federal Building contains one main entrance that faces the plaza. However,
employees of the building may park underneath the building and enter through the
basement. In addition, they may exit from the main entrance, the basement, or an
exit that faces the opposite side of the plaza. The federal building contains 14
floors with offices on all sides of the building. In order for Mr. Murtari’s
message to reach his duly elected representatives, they, or their staff, must
enter the main entrance of the building. Otherwise, they could enter through the
basement, go to their offices that may or may not contain a view of the plaza,
and exit the building through the basement or the alternative exit without ever
knowing that Mr. Murtari was trying to deliver a message to them.
B. The federal permit regulations do not apply to political activities and
even if they did, they have been arbitrarily and subjectively applied by GSA
employees in violation of the First Amendment.
(1) The permit regulations apply to educational, recreational, and cultural
activities and not political activities
The Code of Federal Regulations, subpart 101-20.4, entitled "Occasional
Use of Public Buildings" "establish the rules and regulations for the
occasional use of public areas for cultural, educational and recreational
activities." 41 CFR §101-20.400. Although Mr. Murtari was not charged with
violating the permit regulations, during Mr. Murtari’s trial, the Government
requested the court to take judicial notice of this subpart because the permit
regulations applied only to educational, recreational and cultural activities
and not political activities. (A78). In light of this request, the Government
continuously argued to the court that Mr. Murtari was demonstrating in the
building without applying for a permit where one was required. (A145,150).
However, if the scope of the permit regulations apply only to the listed
activities and excludes political activities, then Mr. Murtari was not required
to apply for a permit to walk the corridors of the building carrying his
placard.
In addition, Mr. Murtari was informed by a GSA employee, David Talarico, that
the permit application system concerned only the outside plaza area of the
federal building and not the interior of the federal building. (A59-62).
Although Mr. Talarico knew that the GSA had granted a man a permit to read
poetry in the lobby of the federal building, he informed Mr. Murtari that he
could not obtain a permit to demonstrate inside the federal building. (A72).
(2) Although the permit regulations comply with the First Amendment on their
face, their application violates the First Amendment because they are
arbitrarily and subjectively enforced by GSA employees.
A prior restraint on speech occurs when administrative and judicial orders
forbid certain communications in advance of the time that such communication is
to occur. Alexander v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2766,2771 (1993). The Supreme
Court has warned that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes
to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 US 58, 70 (1963). The heavy
presumption is justified because "prior restraints on speech...are the most
serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights."
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 US 529, 559 (1975). Assuming that the
federal permit regulations do apply to Mr. Murtari’s political activity inside
the federal building, then the regulations require Mr. Murtari to obtain written
permission from the GSA before Mr. Murtari may exercise his protected First
Amendment activity. If a speaker must seek permission or review before speaking,
then the system is a prior restraint. Moore v. Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364,386 (5th
Cir. 1989).
The permit policy requires an individual to complete a written application
providing the name, address and telephone number of the applicant, the
organization sponsoring the proposes activity, the individual responsible for
supervising the activity along with a description of the proposed activity,
including dates, times and the number of people involved. 41 CFR § 101-20.401.
The GSA must approve or disapprove the permit within 10 working days following
its receipt of the completed application. 41 CFR § 101-20.402(a). When more
than one permit is requested for the same area and times, permits will be issued
on a first-come, first-served basis. 41 CFR § 101-20.402(b). All permits
involving demonstrations and activities which may lead to civil disturbances
should be coordinated with the Chief, Law Enforcement Branch, before approval.
41 CFR § 101-20.402(c).
The GSA may disapprove any application or cancel an issued permit for six
stated reasons: (1) The applicant has failed to submit all information required
under 101-20.401, or has falsified such information; (2) The proposed use is a
commercial activity as defined in 101-20.003(d); (3) The proposed use interferes
with access to the public area, disrupts official Government business,
interferes with approved uses of the property by tenants or by the public, or
damages any property; (4) The proposed use is intended to influence or impede
any pending judicial proceeding; (5) The proposed use is obscene within the
meaning of obscenity as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1461-65; or (6) The proposed use
is violative of the prohibition against political solicitations in 18 U.S.C. §
607. 41 CFR §101-20.403 (a)(1)-(6). The GSA is required to promptly notify the
applicant or permittee of the reasons for disapproving an application or
cancelling a permit and must inform the applicant or permittee of his/her appeal
rights. 41 CFR § 101-20.403(b).
The permit application (GSA Form 3453), states that it is an application for
use of space in public buildings and grounds. (A156). Mr. Murtari was informed
by GSA employee David Talarico on December 16, 1999 that he could not obtain a
permit from GSA to walk quietly in the corridors of the building carrying a
placard. (A59-62). Although Mr. Murtari’s activity does not fall within any of
the above cited categories, he was notified, before applying for a permit, that
he could not obtain one. He was not given a reason for the denial and he was not
informed of his right to appeal this verbal decision.
The testimony of Joan Grennan and Mr. Talarico reveal that GSA had a policy,
outside of the permit regulations, of prohibiting political speech inside the
federal building. The testimony from those responsible for enforcing the permit
regulations reveal that they were arbitrarily and subjectively applied to Mr.
Murtari since he was allowed to proceed on certain occasions and not on others.
Mr. Murtari was allowed to demonstrate on the 8th and 13th floors of the federal
building without interference for a month and a half after March of 2000.
(A69-70,120-121). Building Manager Joan Grennan testified that she did not know
if Mr. Murtari was allowed to demonstrate inside the federal building and that
she had to ask Federal Protective Officer Berwald if Mr. Murtari’s activity
was legal. (A87-88). Officer Berwald "did not believe so." (A88).
After this conversation, Ms. Grennan and Officer Berwald chose to conduct an
experiment with Mr. Murtari by allowing him to walk the corridors of the 13th
floor as long as the tenants on that floor did not object. (A92-95). Ms. Grennan’s
motivation in conducting the experiment was her hope that Mr. Murtari would stop
and go away. (A95). Although Ms. Grennan testified that the permission was
granted for one day (A95), David Talarico testified that Mr. Murtari was given
blanket permission over a certain period of time. (A69,74). Mr. Talarico
believed Mr. Murtari was allowed to proceed without interference between 5 and
20 times. (A77-78).
Although the permit regulations appear to have guidelines, they are
unconstitutionally applied to Mr. Murtari by GSA employees. Even though Mr.
Murtari’s form of expression did not fall within any of the 6 enumerated
categories that allow GSA to deny him a permit, he was told that he would never
obtain a permit to conduct his activity inside the federal building.
POINT III
THE COURT’S ORDER OF DECEMBER 13, 2002 PROHIBITING MR. MURTARI FROM VISITING
THE OFFICES OF SENATORS CLINTON AND SCHUMER AND FROM MARCHING, PICKETING,
PROTESTING, OR DEMONSTRATING IN THE INTERIOR OF THE FEDERAL BUILDING IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRIOR RESTRAINT ON SPEECH.
On December 13, 2002, Magistrate DiBianco issued an Order that prohibits Mr.
Murtari from engaging in marching, picketing, protesting, or demonstrating in
the interior of the James M. Hanley Federal Building without prior, written
permission of the GSA in the form of a permit for the private use of federal
property. (A165). The Order also prohibits Mr. Murtari from visiting the offices
of Senators Clinton and Schumer. (A165). As previously mentioned, the permit
regulations do not appear to apply to political activities, and if they do, GSA
employees have stated that they do not apply to the interior of the federal
building. In accord with the above cited First Amendment law regarding prior
restraints, the court’s order of December 13, 2002, is an unconstitutional
restriction on speech and must be vacated.
The court’s Order "threatens at least three of the values that
undergird the First Amendment: truth, knowledge, and tolerance." Moore v.
Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 386 (5th Cir. 1989). Mr. Murtari has been directed by the
court not to speak to his United States Senators about his political concerns.
"When speech is gagged...the words do not go forth" and "[t]the
public does not receive information, so the public is denied the opportunity to
judge the truth of the speech, and is deprived of useful knowledge necessary to
be able to make informed decisions." Id. The effect of this prior restraint
results in censorship by the court. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 US 444 (1938).
This is especially true in Mr. Murtari’s case, because the order contains no
time limit and no guidelines and therefore serves as a "device for the
suppression of the communication of ideas and permits the official to act as a
censor." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US 536, 557 (1965). "Censorship
distorts the dissemination of truth and knowledge to conform with the official’s
vision of truth and knowledge." Moore 877 F.2d at 386.
The court’s Order contains no time limits, it is completely devoid of
evidence that Mr. Murtari poses any kind of threat to Senators Schumer and
Clinton justifying a ban on visitation to their offices. The Order is based upon
the court’s finding that Mr. Murtari was convicted after trial of violating 18
U.S.C. § 13 (Assimilated Crimes Act/Trespassing and Disorderly Conduct) and
that Mr. Murtari has been charged on previous occasions with the same conduct
for which he has been found guilty. (A165). The Order then goes on to state that
Mr. Murtari’s "stated purpose for his protest in the interior of the
Federal Building in Syracuse, New York is to obtain federal legislation with
respect to child custody and/or visitation matters, and that John Murtari has
already succeeded in bringing these issues to the attention of two offices of
the United States Senators located in the Federal Building." (A165-166).
The court has in essence decided that Mr. Murtari’s message has gone as far as
the court wishes it to go. The court, by its Order, has become the screener of
Mr. Murtari’s message. Thus, the Order clearly violates the First Amendment
and must be vacated.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Murtari’s convictions on counts 3 and 4 of
the Superseding Information must be reversed; the Superseding Information must
be dismissed because Mr. Murtari’s activities were protected by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution; and the court’s December 13, 2002
Order must be vacated because it is an unconstitutional prior restraint on
speech.
DATED: January 13, 2003 Respectfully submitted, ALEXANDER BUNIN
By:
Lisa A. Peebles, Esq.
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Bar Roll No. 507041
Melissa A. Tuohey, Esq. (as to Brief)
Research and Writing Attorney
Bar Roll No.: 510807
The Clinton Exchange, 3rd Floor
4 Clinton Square
Syracuse, New York 13202
(315) 701-0080
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